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SEQRA'S SIBLINGS: PRECEDENTS FROM LITTLE
NEPA'S IN THE SISTER STATES
Nicholas A. Robinson*

,

Most environmental degradation occurs incrementally and cumulatively. The small homebuilder blacktops and covers a vacant lot,
thereby increasing the flow of casual surface waters on other lots in
the watershed; by itself the effect is not noticed, but when several
score of homebuilders repeat the event, flooding occurs downstream.
The same is true of the isolated discharge of one smokestack's emissions into the atmosphere or the seemingly isolated filling of a small
riverside marsh. When one road is sited, few see how it bisects a wildlife habitat or foresee how it triggers further new developments in its
wake.
Indeed, as the biologist Garret Hardin has observed, a person's rational self-interest may usually be to exploit natural resources or
property to the maximum extent possible without regard to the cumulative effect that ultimately inures to the detriment of the same
person.' Even when a town arrests adverse trends within its jurisdiction: the gasoline alley or fast food strip often locates a t the border
of the town in greater or more troublesome concentrations than
would have otherwise been the case.
No single nostrum can establish a healthful and pleasing environment. No statute can legislate a sound environment into existence.
Rather, environmental quality will be the result of many isolated and
discrete decisions, each one structured so as to avert environmental
degradation. Progress in society can then be realized without the unintended harm that might otherwise result.
As Lord Eric Ashby puts it, human endeavor can become a sympathetic part of the natural envir~nment.~
In place of a conflict with
nature brought on by pollution and other environmental harm, there
can be a reconciliation of human society and nature. This becomes
Associate Professor of Law, Pace University School of Law. A.B., Brown University; J.D.,
Columbia University. In 1975, Professor Robinson sewed on the Environmental Advisory Task
Force to Governor Hugh Carey which proposed the adoption of SEQRA to the Governor.
Hardin, The Tragedy of the Commons, 162 SCIENCE
1243 (1968).
' See, e.g., Golden v. Planning Bd., 30 N.Y.2d 359,285 N.E.2d 291,334 N.Y.S.2d 138, appeal
dismissed, 409 U.S. 1003 (1972); Annot., 63 A.L.R.3d 1184 (1975).
a E. ASHBY,
RECONCILING
MANWITHTHEENVIRONMENT
(1978).
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possible "not by heroic long-term megadecision, but by the cumulative effect of wise medium-term microdecisions, each decision clarifying the shape of the decision that needs to follow."'
The technique of environmental impact assessment has emerged as
the principal regulatory tool for assuring that each person acts "so
that due consideration is given to preventing environmental damage."6 Just as the National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA)6 requires that each of the.federa1 government's agencies assure that its
decisions will be environmentally sound, so have many of the various
states decreed that their agencies and political subdivisions shall
maximize environmental protection.
SEQRA's SIBLINGS
I. NEPA's PROGENY:
New York's State Environmental Quality Review Act (SEQRA)' is
ably described throughout this Symposium. It mandates that New
York governmental units "conduct their affairs with an awareness
that they are stewards of the air, water, land and living resources,
and that they have an obligation to protect the environment for the
use and enjoyment of this and all future generation^."^
In adopting SEQRA in 1975, New York joined a number of states
that had followed the lead of Congress in enacting NEPA.@The state
environmental policy acts, often referred to as "little NEPA's," occassionally copy NEPA almost verbatim.1° Most, however, make extensive adaptations ranging from the Michigan Environmental Protection Act, adopted contemporaneously with NEPA, which makes
unlawful the "pollution, impairment or destruction of the air, water
' Id. at 87.
N.Y. ENVTL.CONSERV.
LAW $ 8-0103(9) (McKinney Supp. 1981-1982). For a discussion o f
the quality and extent o f "due consideration," see Ulasewicz, The Department of Environmental Conservation and SEQRA: Upholding its Mandates and Charting Parameters for the Elusive Socio-Economic Assessment, 46 ALB. L. REV. 1255 (1982).
42 U.S.C. $ 4321-4369 (1976). For further NEPA details see Orloff,SEQRA: New York's
Reformation of NEPA, 46 ALB. L. REV. 1128 (1982).
' N.Y. ENVTL.CONSERV.LAW $5 8-0101 to -0117 (McKinney Supp. 1981-1982). For background on SEQRA, see Marsh, Introduction-SEQRA's Scope and Objectives, 46 ALB. L. REV.
1097 (1982).
' N.Y. ENVTL.CONSERV.LAW 5 8-0103(8) (McKinney Supp. 1981-1982). See Marsh, supra
note 7 , at 1104.
1975 N.Y. Laws ch. 612. See also Orloff,supra note 6 , at 1129.
'O See, e.g., Montana Environmental Policy Act, MONT.REV. CODE
ANN.§$ 69-6501 to -6517
(1971) (current version at id. $$ 75-1-101 t o -324 (1981));Public Policy Environmental Act, P.
R. LAWSA N N .tit. 12, $5 1121-1140 (1970) (current version at id. $8 1121-1142 (1978 & Supp.
1980)).
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or other natural resources or the public trust therein" unless there
are no prudent and feasible alternatives," to states with statutes that
require an environmental impact assessment by executive order of
the governor for selected actions only.la
Most of the twenty-eight jurisdictions that have little NEPA requirements incorporate the same administrative procedures as does
the federal environmental impact statement (EIS) process.lS For this
reason, there is considerable borrowing of case law and interpretation
from one state to another. A common body of law guides the EIS
process in whatever jurisdiction it comes to be adopted.
In this manner, the EIS process enjoys' a status similar to a uni-.
form state law such as the Uniform Commercial Code. When a question arises as to which types of alternatives should be examined in an
EIS, guidance can be found in federal decisions under NEPA, or in
leading cases under. little NEPA's such as the California Environmental Quality Act (CEQA)14and Washington's State Environmental
Policy Act of 1971 (SEPA).16
There are currently twenty-eight jurisdictions with an EIS requirement. Fifteen states and Puerto Rico have enacted comprehensive
laws like NEPA.16 Michigan has a law more substantial than NEPA,
MICH.STAT.ANN.8 14.528(205)(2) (Callaghan 1980). For text of the full Thomas J. Anderson, Gordon Rockwell Environmental Protection Act of 1970, see MICH. STAT. ANN. $8
14.528(201) - .528(207) (Callaghan 1980).
la See, e.g., Exec. Order of April 23, 1971 (Hawaii); Exec. Order No. 53 (N.J. 1973); Admin.
Order No. 33 (N.J. 1973). Hawaii has since enacted an EIS statute. See HAWAII
REV.STAT.88
343-1 to -8 (Supp. 1980).
'"2 U.S.C. 8 4332(2)(c) (1976). See generally, [I9791 COUNCIL
ON ENVIRONMENTAL QUALITY
ANN.REP., ENVIRONMENTAL
QUALITY
591, 595-602.
CAL.PUB.RES. CODE88 21000-21176 (Deering 1976 & Supp. 1982) (the uniform requirement for all California state agencies, boards and commissions).
ID
WASH.REV.CODE$8 43.21C.010-.910 (Supp. 1981).
le The current versions of the statutes for these jurisdictions are as follows: California, see
California Environmental Policy Act, CAL.PUB. RES. CODE$8 21000-21176 (Deering 1976 &
Supp. 1982); Connecticut, see Connecticut Environmental Policy Act of 1973, CONN.GEN.STAT.
ANN.$8 22a-1 to -7 (Supp. 1974-1975); Hawaii, see Governor's Executive Order of August 21,
REV. STAT.$8 343-1 to -8 (Supp. 1980); Indiana, see IND.
1974, as supplemented by HAWAII
CODEANN.$8 13-1-10-1 to -8 (Burns 1981); Maryland, see Maryland Environmental Policy Act
of 1973, MD. NAT.RES. CODEANN.$8 1-301 to -305 (1974 & Supp. 1981); Massachusetts, see
Massachusetts Environmental Policy Act, MASS.ANN.LAWSch. 30, $8 61-62H (MichieLaw
Coop. 1973 & Supp. 1981); Minnesota, see Minnesota Environmental Policy Act of 1973, MINN.
STAT.ANN.$8 116D.01-.07 (1977 & Supp. 1981); Montana, see MONT.REV.CODESANN.$8 75-1101 to -324 (1981); North Carolina, see North Carolina Environmental Policy Act of 1971, N.C.
GEN. STAT.$8 113A-1 to -10 (1978); South Dakota, see South Dakota Environmental Policy
Act, S.D. CODIFIED
LAWSANN.85 34A-9-1 to -13 (1977 & Supp. 1981); Virginia, see Virginia
Environmental Quality Act, VA. CODE$8 10-107.107-.112, 10-177 to -186 (1978 & Supp. 1981);
Washington, see State Environmental Policy Act of 1971, WASH. REV. CODE ANN. 38
43.21C.010-.910 (Supp. 1981), as supplemented by 1981 Wash. Laws chs. 278 & 290, Wisconsin,
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and New Mexico, which had a little NEPA, repealed it after a short
time.17 Four states have promulgated comprehensive executive orders
Nine states
establishing procedures equivalent to the EIS functi~n.'~
have established an EIS function for specified limited purposes.le
Courts in states with legislatively enacted little NEPA's look to
federal case law for authority and guidance by analogy in construing
their state act.a0There is also a growing literature in the law reviews
about the operation of these state laws;a1this body of commentary is
see Wisconsin Environmental Policy Act of 1971, WIS. STAT.ANN.$ 1.11 (Supp. 1981-1982);
Puerto Rico, see Public Policy Environmental Act, P.R. LAWSANN.tit. 12, 58 1121-1142 (1978
& Supp. 1980).
l7 Michigan Environmental Protection Act of 1970, MICH. STAT. ANN. $5 14.528(201).528(207) (Callaghan 1980); N.M. STAT.ANN.$5 12-20-1 to -7 (Supp. 1973), repealed by 1973
N.M. Laws ch. 46. Regarding the repeal of the New Mexico statute, see Comment, The Rbe
and Demise of the New Mexico Environmental Quality Act, "Little NEPA," 14 NAT. Rm. J.
401 (1974).
These four states, with their executive orders and implementing regulations, are as follows:
Michigan, see Michigan Executive Directive 1971-10, as superseded by Michigan Executive Order '1973-9, as superseded by Michigan Order 1974-4 (May 1974); New Jersey, see New Jersey
Executive Order No. 53 (Oct. 15, 1973); Texas, see Policy for the Environment (Mar. 7, 1972),
published in Environment for Tomorrow: The Texas Response, updated by The Environment
Policy-Guidelines and Procedures for Processing EIS's, (Nov. 1975); Utah, see State of Utah
Executive Order (Aug. 27, 1974).
'O The states with environmental impact assessment processes limited in scope are the following: Arizona, see Game and Fish Commission Policy of July 2, 1971, see also Memorandum
by the Arizona Game and Fish Commission, Requirements for Environmental Impact Statements (June 9, 1971); Delaware, see Coastal Zone Act, DEL. CODEANN. tit. 7, $$ 7001-7003
(1974, Supp. 1980 & Interim Supp. 1981); The Tidal Wetlands Act, DEL. CODEANN.tit. 7, $5
6601-6620 (1974); Georgia, see GA.CODEANN.$5 95A-101 to -1306a (1976 & Supp. 1981); Kentucky, see KY. REV.STAT.$ 278.025 (1981); Mississippi, see Coastal Wetlands Protection Law,
MISS. CODEANN.56 49-27-1 to -69 (Supp. 1981); Nebraska, see N~RASKA
DEP'T OF ROADS,
ACTIONPLAN(1973), as revised by, NEBRASKA
DEP'T OP ROADS,ENVIRONMENTAL
ACTIONPLAN
(1975); Nevada, see NEV.R&v. STAT.$5 321.610-.770 (1979); New Jersey, see Coastal Area Facility Review Act, N.J. STAT.ANN.$8 1319-1 to -21 (West 1979 & Supp. 1981-1982); The Wetlands Act of 1970, N.J. STAT.ANN. $$ 139A-1 to -10 (West 1979); N.J. STAT.ANN. 12:s-3
(West 1979); Rhode Island, see Rhode Island Environmental Righta Act, R.I. GEN.LAWS$ 1020-8(b) (Supp. 1981).
'O See, e.g., Friends of Mammoth v. Mono County, 8 Cal. 3d 247, 260-61, 502 P.2d 1049,
1057-58, 104 Cal. Rptr. 761,769-70 (1972); People v. County of Kern, 39 Cal. App. 3d 830,841,
115 Cal. Rptr. 67, 75 (1974); Eastlake Community Council v. Roanoke Aesocs., Inc., 82 Wash.
2d 475,513 P.2d 36 (1973); Wisconsin's Environmental Decade, Inc. v. Public Sew. Comm'n, 69
Wis. 2d 1, 230 N.W.2d 243 (1975). See a b o Secretary of Envtl. Affairs v. Massachusetts Port
Auth., 366 Mass. 755, 323 N.E.2d 329 (1975); Minnesota Pub. Interest Research Group v. Minnesota Envtl. Quality Council, 306 Minn. 370, 237 N.W.2d 376 (1975); Town of Henrietta v.
Department of Envtl. Conservation, 76 A.D.2d 215, 220, 430 N.Y.S.2d 440, 445 (1980);
H.O.M.E.S. v. New York State Urban Dev. Corp., 69 A.D.2d 222, 231, 418 N.Y.S.2d 827, 832
(1979).
" On little NEPA's generally, see note 16 supra. See a k o [I9771 COUNCIL
ON ENVIRONMENTAL
QUALITY
ANN.REP., ENVIRONMENTAL
QUALITY119-21, 130-35; Hagman, NEPA's Progeny Inhabit the States- Were the Genes Defective?, 7 URB. L. ANN.3 (1974); Pridgeon, Anderson &
Delphey, State Environmental Policy Acts: A Survey of Recent Developments, 2 HARV.
ENVTL.

s
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of increasing value to bench and bar,alike.aa
New York's SEQRA was adopted at least four years after the federal, California and Washington statutes. Because of precedent from
these other jurisdictions,.there was no question in New York about
applying SEQRA to private projects requiring a state permit, as had
L. REV.419 (1977); Yost, NEPA's Progeny: State Environmental Policy Acts, 3 ENVTL.L. REP.
(ENVTL.
L. INST.) ll 50,090 (1973); Note, Emerging State Programs To Protect the Environment: "Little NEPA's" and Beyond, 5 ENVTL.
AFFAIRS
567 (1976); Comment, 6 ENVTL.
L. REP.
(ENVTL.
L. INST.) ll 10,216 (1976); Comment, 7 ENVTL.
L. REP.(ENVTL.
L. INST.) ll 10,187 (1977).
Note, State Environmental Impact Statements, 15 Washburn L.J. 64 (1976).
" For articles on California's law, see Hildreth, Environmental Impact Under the California
Environmental Quality Act: The Reports: New Legal Framework, 17 SANTACLARAL. REV.805
(1977); Lynch, The 1973 CEQ Guidelines: Cautious Updating of the Environmental Impact
W.L. REV. 297 (1975); Comment, Substantive EnforceStatement Process, Comment, 11 CALIF.
ment of the California Environmental Quality Act, 69 CALIF.
L. REV.112 (1981) [hereinafter
cited as Substantive Enforcement];Comment, Exclusionary Zoning: A Project for the California Environmental Control Act?, 19 SANTACLARAL. REV.777 (1979); Note, California Environmental Quality Act and Eminent Domain: Failure to Comply with CEQA as a Defense to
Condemnation, 8 Lou. L.A. L. REV. 734 (1975); Note, Controlled Burning of Rangeland in
California: Should CEQA Apply?, 11 U.C.D.L. Rev. 649 (1978); Note, Environmental Decision
Making Under CEQA: A Quest for Uniformity, 24 U.C.L.A. L. REV.838 (1977) [hereinafter
cited as Quest for Uniformity];Environmental Law Symposium, 19 SANTACLARAL. REV.513
(1979). For articles on Florida's statute, see Comment, Environmental Law: The Inapplicability of the Special Injury Rule to the Florida Environmental Protection Act, 33 U. h a . L. REV.
425 (1981). For commentary on the Michigan law, see Note, PBB Action Committee v. DNR:
The Feasible and Prudent Alternative Argument Under the Michigan Environmental Protection Act, 1979 DET.C.L. REV.457; Comment, New Growth in Michigan's Environmental Protection Act: State Supreme Court Enjoins Oil Development in Wilderness, 9 ENVTL.L. REP.
(ENVTL.
L. INST.) ll 10,144 (1979). For a discussion of Minnesota's statute, see Research Project,
An Assessment of the Minnesota Environmental Impact Statement Process, 3 HAMLINEL.
REV. 63 (1980); Note, Environmental Law: Minnesota Environmental Policy Act, 4 W M .
MITCHELL
L. REV.238 (1978). For an analysis of the Montana law, see Tobias & McLean, Of
Crabbed Interpretations and Frustrated Mandates: The Effect of Environmental Policy Acts
on Pre-existing Agency Authority, 41 MONT.L. REV.177, 234-67 (1980). For commentary on
New York's statute, see Manes, Alice in the Wonderland of S.E.Q.R., 52 N.Y.S.B.J. 115 (1980);
Nichols & Robinson, A Primer on New York's Revolutionized Environmental Laws: Part I, 49
N.Y.S.B.J. 41 (1977); Robinson, Update on State-Impact Review Laws, N.Y.L.J., Aug. 26,
1980, at 1, col. 1; Sandler, State Environmental Quality Review Act, 49 N.Y.S.B.J. 110 (1977);
Weinberg, What Every Real Estate Lawyer Should Know About New York's SEQRA, 52
N.Y.S.B.J. 114 (1980); Note, New York State Environmental Quality ~ e v i e wAct: An Overview
and Analysis, 41 ALB.L. REV.23 (1977). For a discussion of the Washington statute, see Roe &
Lean, The State Environmental Policy Act of 1971 'cmd Its 1973 Amendments, 49 WASH.L.
REV.583 (1973); Comment, Judicial Review of Compliance with the State Environmental Policy Act of 1971: Recent Developments, 10 GONZ.L. REV. 803 (1975); Comment The 1974
Amendments to Washington's State Environmental Policy Act, 10 GONZ.L. REV.787 (1975);
Note, Threshold Determination of the State Environmental Policy Act: Washington Adopts a
More Flexible Approach-Equitable Remedies: Laches Defense Restricted, 56 WASH.L. REV.
549 (1981); Note, A Standard for Judicial Review of Administrative Decisionmaking Under
SEPA, 54 WASH.L. REV. 693 (1979). For a commentary on Wisconsin's law, see Special Project,
Agency Decisionmaking Under the Wisconsin Environmental Policy Act, 1977 WIS.L. REV.
111 [hereinafter cited as Wisconsin Environmental Policy].
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been litigated in the seminal California decision in Friends of Mammoth o. Board of S u p e r ~ i s o r sThere
. ~ ~ was also no question that the
EIS duty was a serious and fundamental administrative responsibility, as described in the federal ruling in Culvert Cliffs' Coordinating
Commit!ee, Inc. v. United States Atomic Energy C o m m i ~ s i o n . ~ ~
CEQA had already been amended once by the time New York enacted SEQRA. When it did so, New York was able to benefit from
the experiences of California and twelve other states with little
NEPA'S.'~
The legislature actively considered this corpus of jurisprudence
when it shaped SEQRA.s6 The actual operations under the California
Act were described to the legislature by the chief of that state's Office
of Environmental Protection, Nicholas Yost." Reports from other
states were solicited and reviewed.as Assemblyman Oliver Koppel expressed New York's debt to California on the eve of SEQRA's taking
effect June 1, 1976, as follows:
Fortunately, we do have substantial information in the experience of
California, a state which has had such a law since 1970. The states
have much in common, apart from the fact that much of the New York
act is patterned on the earlier California model. Both states are large,
populous and diverse. . .
.¶@

8 Cal. 3d 247, 502 P.2d 1049, 104 Cal. Rptr. 761 (1972).
449 F.2d 1109 (D.C. Cir. 1971).
The states that had an EIS requirement in 1975 were California, Connecticut, Hawaii,
Indiana, Maryland, Massachusetts, Minnesota, Montana, North Carolina, South Dakota, Virginia, Washington and Wisconsin. See note 16,supra.
See Koppell, Environmental Protection Laws At Issue, N.Y.L.J., May 6, 1976, a t 1, col. 2
(an essay by the chairman of the New York State Assembly Environmental Conservation
Committee).
'' Id. Mr. Yost later became general counsel to the President's Council on Environmental
Quality in the administration of President Carter.
2 V d . (citing Massachusetts Executive Office of Environmental Affairs and Virginia Council
on the Environment reporta on the number of environmental impact reports and the time used
in considering those reports).
le Id. Assemblyman Koppell further observed that:
According to Nicholas C. Yost, Deputy Attorney General in charge of the environmental unit of the Attorney General's Office in California, the California experience is that
environmental reporting has worked, and worked well. There were fears of opening the
flood gates of litigation. These fears have not materialized. Mr. Yost reported that with
over 400 cities in California and 58 counties, plus several hundred special districts and
all of the agencies of State government, the Attorney General's records indicated some
approximately 103 suits since 1970-an average of something over twenty suite a year.
A report of the California Attorney General's office indicated that California's environmental impact reporting statute has not been "a vehicle for delay or frustration of
projects on nonmeritorious grounds." The Attorney General's report concluded, that
both in overall numerical terms and in relation to the number of agencies implementing
their environmental consulting firm, confirms this conclusion (sic) . . . .
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Indeed, shortly after the adoption of SEQRA, commentators were already citing California precedents to assist in the proper interpretation of SEQRA.SOIn like vein, the Practising Law Institute provided
a continuing legal education course in 1978 on SEQRA featuring the
California and Washington statutes, along with NEPA, as principal
sources of authority for construing SEQRA.sl As observed by Professor Phillip Weinberg, who was in charge of the Environmental Protection Bureau in the New York State Attorney General's Office a t
the time of SEQRA's enactment:
SEQRA had as its model [NEPA], which since January 1, 1970 has
required every federd agency performing, permitting or funding any
major action with a substantial impact on the environment to weigh
the environmental effects of its action and to prepare an environmental
impact statement-to look, in short, before it leaps, or permits someone else to. Even more in point, a number of states, notably California
and Washington, had also enacted environmental impact laws with
parallel mandates. Our Legislature adapted these laws to New York's
needs, requiring the state, localities and private businesses acting
under state or local permit or funding to consider the impact of their
action on the environment and to document that consideration by furnishing a reviewable record.8P
The teaching of these authorities is obvious. Both the bench and
bar should examine the case law under little NEPA's in other states
before "recreating the wheel" in New York. In some instances, New
York ought not to follow case law from a sister state. The provisions
of SEQRA may be so different as to make the authority inapplicable.
Similarly, the ruling may be inadequate to the needs of New York.
In general, the fear of increased litigation, as reviewed above, is believed not to be well
founded. It should be noted that the experience from other states, particularly California, is that there simply has not been the degree of litigation stemming from environmental reporting which was originally feared. In light.of its stringent rule protecting
administrative decisions, . . . New York is no more likely than California to have exceesive litigation.
Similarly, with respect to reporting delays and costa, studies from Maesachwetta and
California do not appear to suggest that either will be inordinate. If the SEQR Act ia
properly implemented at the State and local agency levels, ita procedures can and should
be carried out with and at the same time as other requirements of planning, with minimum delay, if a t all, and with expense commensurate with other necessary planning
costs and not excessive in light of the importance of assuring that the future growth of
the state is properly planned in the intereata of both a prosperow and livable state.
Id. .at 4 (footnotes omitted).
SO Sandler, supra note 22, a t 115-16.
PRACTISING
LAWINSTITUTE,
STATEENVIRONMENTAL
QUALITY
REVIEWCOMPLIANCE:
A PRACTICAL APPROACH
AT THE LOCAL
GOVERNMENT
LEVEL (J. Sache ed. 1978).
'' Weinberg, supra note 22, a t 120 (citations omitted).
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Whether or not this analogous case law is followed, however, it
should at least be considered.
The strength which a common body of law possesses is the intellectual force and perception of each decision's ratio decidendi; especially in rulings of first impression, the advocate and judge should at
least examine prior rulings of the key states having statutes substantially similar to SEQRA. Since the environmental problems themselves are apt to be similar from state to state, and since commercial
activity most often has interstate characteristics, society is best
served by promoting a common pattern of environmental impact assessment. This will lead to predictabilty and shared expectations,
strengthening both an ordered society with the rule of law and environmental protection.

It is beyond the scope, and probably capacity, of this Article to
identify every possible issue under SEQRA for which authority may
be found in a sister state. Nonetheless, it may be instructive to illustrate how analogous case law from other states may be drawn upon to
further SEQRA.88Obviously, other states may be drawn upon to further SEQRA. The little NEPA precedents may most usefully be
sought not in the context of state agency actions which are often
analogous to federal agency actions; rather, the state rulings are most
valuable in construing the duties of villages, towns, cities, counties
and other political subdivisions of a state. Two examples can demonstrate these matters. The first concerns the realm of the stewardship
which the little NEPA's require. The second involves the details of
the environmental impact assessment process itself.

A. Ethics and Stewardship
One leading case under SEQRA is Tuxedo Conservation and Taxpayers Association u. Town Board.84In Tuxedo, the town board had
final SEQRA approval authority over a 200 million dollar project,
which would quadruple the town's pop~lation.~'One town trustee

" Aa well, the large body of federal case law under NEPA should be examined closely. See
Orloff, supra note 6.
96 Misc. 2d 1, 408 N.Y.S.2d 668 (Sup. Ct. 1978), aff'd, 69 A.D.2d 320, 418 N.Y.S.2d 638
(1979).
a6 Id. at 7, 408 N.Y.S.2d at 671.
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was an officer of an advertising agency, employed by the developer
. ~ ~refused to disqualify himself, however, and
parent c o r p o r a t i ~ nHe
cast the decisive vote despite the probability of his firm's financial
intere~t.~'
Although no ethics statutes had been violated, both trial
and appellate courts in Tuxedo rigorously condemned the trustee's
action and invalidated the project approval.88
The Tuxedo decision held the town board trustee to the standard
of "the punctilio of an honor the most s e n ~ i t i v e , "in~ ~the context of
SEQRA decisions as "stewards of the air, water, land, and living resources" with "an obligation" to "this and all future generation~.'"~
About the same time as Tuxedo, the courts in California were reaching a different view. A badly divided California Supreme Court in
Woodland Hills Residents Associations v. City Counci141failed to insist upon the punctilio of honor. The court held that campaign contributions to city council members do not prevent them from deciding matters involving contributor^.^^ Finding no literal violation of
the statute, the court refused to imply a violation from the circumstance~.'~
Thus, the court ignored even "the amount of the contribution, its timing, its method, as well as the significance of the issue
being conhidered . . . in judging the appearance of biasmW4'
It may be that the unfortunate recent legislative criticisms of the
California Supreme Court have cast it into a timid mold. The California court's deference to the legislature,' in the face of "the mother's
milk of politics"46 (that is, campaign contributions to CEQA decisionmakers), does little to ensure a full measure of environmental
8e Tuxedo Conservation and Taxpayers Ass'n. v. Town Bd., 69 A.D.2d 320,323,418 N.Y.S.2d
638, 639 (1979).
Id. The court noted that the trustee had knowingly participated and had even requested a
local committee's ethics opinion. Id. a t 323, 418 N.Y.S.2d a t 639-40.
" "For, like Caesar's wife, a public official must be above suspicion." Id. a t 324,418 N.Y.S.2d
at 640. The trial court expressed a similar view: "Considering the scope of thii application
(1,500 acres, 3,900 units and one fifth of a billion dollars), only the naive would not suspect that
there could be tacit business pressures conflicting with the right of the public to a fair hearing."
Tuxedo Conservation and Taxpayers Ass'n v. Town Bd., 96 Misc. 2d 1, 10, 408 N.Y.S.2d 668,
673 (Sup. Ct. 1978), aff'd, 69 A.D.2d 320, 418 N.Y.S.2d 638 (1979).
Tuxedo Conservation and Taxpayers Ass'n v. Town Bd., 69 A.D.2d 320,324,418 N.Y.S.2d
638, 640 (1979) (citing Meinhard v. Salmon, 249 N.Y. 458, 464, 164 N.E. 545, 546 (1928) (Cardozo, C.J.)).
N.Y. ENVTL.CONSERV.
LAW8 8-0103(8) (McKinney Supp. 1981-1982).
41 26 Cal. 3d 938, 609 P.2d 1029, 164 Cal. Rptr. 255 (1980).
4s Id. at 947, 609 P.2d a t 1033, 164 Cal. Rptr. at 259.
" Id. at 946-47, 609 P.2d a t 1032-33, 164 Cal. Rptr. at 259.
Id. at 951-52, 609 P.2d at 1036, 164 Cal. Rptr. a t 262 (Bird, C.J., concurring and dissenting).
46 26 Cal. 3d at 953, 609 P.2d a t 1037, 164 Cal. Rptr. a t 264 (Newman, J., concurring).
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protection. CEQA lacks the express stewardship intent of SEQRA,'6
and that may also explain the difference. Perhaps the public policy
in California is to favor "political influence" in quasi-judicial
A comparable situation in the State of Washington, however,
would be resolved as in New York. Washington's little NEPA tracks
the policies of NEPA, and establishes a stewardship role for government as to nature. All agencies of the state are urged to "[fjulfill the
responsibilities of each generation as trustee of the environment for
succeeding generations."4s Moreover, the Washington legislature has
recognized "that each person has a fundamental and inalienable right
to a healthful environment and that each person has a responsibility
to contribute to the preservation and enhancement of the environment."4e In establishing this policy, Washington goes beyond
Compare CM., PUB.RES. CODE8 21100 (Deering 1981) with N.Y. ENVTL.CONSERV.
LAW§
8-0101 (McKinney Supp. 1981-1982). The California statute provides:
All state agencies, boards, and commissions shall prepare, or cause to be prepared by
contract, and certify the completion of an environmental impact report on any project
they propose to carry out or approve which may have a significant effect on t v environment. Such a report shall include a detailed statement setting forth the following:
(a) The significant environmental effects of the proposed project.
(b) Any significant environmental effects which cannot be avoided if the project is
implemented.
(c) Mitigation measures proposed to minimize the significant environmental effects including, but not limited to, measures to reduce wasteful, inefficient, and unnecessary
consumption of energy.
(d) Alternatives to the proposed project.
(e) The relationship between local short-term.uees of man's environment and the maintenance and enhancement of long-term productivity.
(f) Any significant irreversible environmental changes which would be involved in the
proposed project should it be implemented.
(g) The growth-inducing impact of the proposed project.
The report shall also contain a statement briefly indicating the reasons for determining
that various effects of a project are not significant and consequently have not been discussed in detail in the environmental impact report.
CAL.PUB.RES. CODE8 21100 (Deering 1981). The New York Legislature expressed SEQRA's
purpose as follows:
It is the purpose of this act to declare a state policy which will encourage productive
and enjoyable harmony between man and his environment; to promote efforts which will
prevent or eliminate damage to the environment and enhance human and community
resources; and to enrich the understanding of the ecological systems, natural, human and
community resources important to the people of the state.
N.Y. ENTL.CONSERV.
LAW8 8-0101 (McKinney Supp. 1981-1982).
'' See Note, Woodland Hills v. City Council of Los Angeles: Electoral Politics and QuasiJudicial Fairness, 69 CALIF.L. REV. 1098, 1123 (1981).
WASH.REV.CODEANN.8 43.21c.O20(2)(a) (Supp. 1981), as supplemented by 1981 Wash.
Laws chs. 278 & 290. See Leschi Improvement Council v. Washington State Highway Comm'n,
84 Wash. 2d 271, 525 P.2d 774 (1974) (en banc).
'O WASH.
REV.CODEANN. 8 43.21c.020(3) (1981), as supplemented by 1981 Wash. Laws chs.
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NEPA.60
The judiciary in Washington, as in New York, has properly identified its role in examining impropriety and the appearance of impropriety. Several cases offer guidance for municipal officials as to both
ethics and environmental stewardship^.^' In varied contexts, the
Washington judiciary has developed the "appearance of fairness"
ethical standard for land use decision.6a In Chrobuck u. Snohomish
County,53the Washington Supreme Court considered the rezoning of
an area from a rural-residential to heavy industrial district. The
court recognized that the denial of cross-examination, provision of
trips paid for by the developer to similar plant sites as well as free
entertainment, and prior membership in an organization with a
financial interest in the project were cumulative circumstances condemned as casting "an aura of infl~ence."~In Buell v. City of
B r e m e r t ~ nthe
, ~ ~court focused on the single "infecting" circumstance
of a board member with a financial interest in the project.5e Even
prior or subsequent connections with the project or project sponsor
have been condemned as violating the duty to reach and appear to
reach an unbiased deci~ion.~'Further, in Fleming v. City of Ta278 & 290.
60 42 U.S.C. 8 4331 (1976) embodies Congress' national environmental policy. Unlike the
Washington statute, it does not purport to create any individual rights.
SAVE a Valuable Environment v. City of Bothell, 89 Wash. 2d 862, 576 P.2d 401 (1978)
(en banc); Swift v. Island County, 87 Wash. 2d 348, 552 P.2d 175 (1976) (en banc); Narrowsview Preservation Assoc. v. City of Tacoma, 84 Wash. 2d 416, 526 P.2d 897 (1974) (en banc);
Fleming v. City of Tacoma, 81 Wash. 2d 292,502 P.2d 327 (1972) (en banc); Anderson v. Island
Co., 81 Wash. 2d 312, 501 P.2d 594 (1972) (en banc); Buell v. City of Bremerton, 80 Wash. 2d
518, 495 P.2d 1358 (1972) (en banc); Chrobuck v. Snohomish Co., 78 Wash. 2d 858, 480 P.2d
489 (1971) (en banc). The New York trial court's opinion in Tuxedo cited Chrobuck with approval. Tuxedo Conservation and Taxpayers Ass'n v. Town Bd., 96 Misc. 2d 1,10,408 N.Y.S.2d
668, 673 (1978), aff'd, 69 A.D.2d 320, 418 N.Y.S.2d 638 (1979).
Fleming v. City of Tacoma, 81 Wash. 2d 292, 502 P.2d 327 (1972) (en banc); Anderson v.
Island Co., 81 Wash. 2d 312, 501 P.2d 594 (1972) (en banc); Buell v. City of Bremerton, 80
Wash. 2d 518, 495 P.2d 1358 (1972) (en banc); Chrobuck v. Snohomish Co., 78 Wash. 2d 858,
480 P.2d 489 (1971) (en banc).
78 Wash. 2d 858, 480 P.2d 489 (1971) (en banc).
Id. a t 862-70, 480 P.2d at 492-96. In Fleming u. City of Tacoma, the Washington court
characterized the facts of the Chrobuck case as revealing that there were "close prior social and
business connections with a proponent of the rezone and [that] his successor had publicly supported the proponent's position." Fleming v. City of Tacoma, 81 Wash. 2d 292, 296-97, 502
P.2d 327, 330 (1972) (en banc).
66 80 Wash. 2d 518, 495 P.2d 1358 (1972) (en banc).
" According to' the court, "the self-interest of one member of the planning commission infects the action of the other members of the commission regardless of their disinterestedness."
Id. at 525, 495 P.2d at 1362.
See, e.g., Fleming v. City of Tacoma, 81 Wash. 2d 292, 299-300, 502 P.2d 327,.331 (1972)
(en banc) (subsequent employment); Anderson v. Island County, 81 Wash. 2d 312, 325-27, 501
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coma,68post-decision employment of a council member by the project
sponsor's attorney, and in Anderson v. Island County," the biased
participation of a former owner of the property, caused the courts to
rescind both the ordinance and the reclassification. Although no
wrongdoing was found in any of these cases, the Washington Supreme Court held that the importance of public trust and confidence
mandated that even the appearance of impropriety be avoided.80
This stringent standard was interwoven with the requirements of
environmental stewardship in local bond use decisions in SAVE a
Valuable Environment v. B~thell,~'
Swift v. Island County,8a and
Narrowsview Preservation Association u. City of T a ~ o r n a Inade.~~
quate environmental review and financially interested board members caused the Swift and SAVE courts to void both local zoning
change^.^ In Narrowsview, although the environmental review was
adequate, the court found that the participation of a financially interested board member tainted the zoning a p p r o ~ a l . ~ T hcontinuing
e
scrutiny of the Washington judiciary under the "appearance of fairness" standard encourages fair and impartial land use decisions
which fulfill the responsibility of each citizen to preserve and enhance the envir~nment.~~
P.2d 594, 602 (1972) (en banc) (prior ownership of property).
" 81 Wash. 2d 292, 300, 502 P.2d 327, 331 (1972) (en banc). The employment was entered
into less than 48 hours after the crucial vote. Id. The trial court observed:
The time coincidence is devastating. It is unfortunate this probably has taken place because this was one of those days that we all have where a problem arose and a man just
didn't think about the whole implications of what he was doing. The appearance of conflict of interest is here. The appearance of conflict of interest is so strong that I am sure
those who oppose the zoning and who thought this thing through will never, never believe that somehow this wasn't kind of wired before the final vote was taken.
Id. a t 300, 502 P.2d a t 332.
81 Wash. 2d 312, 501 P.2d 594 (1972) (en banc).
Fleming v. City of Tacoma, 81 Wash. 2d 292, 502 P.2d 327 (1972) (en banc); Anderson v.
Island County, 81 Wash. 2d 312,501 P.2d 594 (1972) (en banc); Buell v. City of Bremerton, 80
Wash. 2d 518,495 P.2d 1358 (1972) (en banc); Chrobuck v. Snohomish County, 78 Wash. 2d a t
858, 480 P.2d 489 (1971) (en banc).
*I 89 Wash. 2d 862, 576 P.2d 401 (1978) (en banc).
" 87 Wash. 2d 348, 552 P.2d 175 (1976) (en banc).
84 Wash. 2d 416, 526 P.2d 897 (1974) (en banc).
" In Swift, there was no environmental review and in SAVE, there was no mitigation of
adverse environmental effects. SAVE a Valuable Environment v. City of Bothell, 89 Wash. 2d
862, 576 P.2d 401 (1978) (en banc); Swift v. Island County, 87 Wash. 2d 348, 552 P.2d 175
(1976) (en banc).
'' Narrowsview Preservation Assoc. v. City of Tacoma, 84 Wash. 2d 416,526 P.2d 897 (1974)
(en banc). The tainted board member was an employee, whose employer would be directly
affected by the decision. Id.
" WASH.REV.CODEANN.8 43.21 C.020(3) (Supp. 1981), as supplemented by 1981 Wash.
Laws chs. 278 & 290.
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Taken seriously, the legislative mandate for stewardship is akin to
the common law duty of a trustee to avoid waste. The trustee owes
all allegiance to the public, present and future, to conserve and best
manage the resources at issue. This task, as New York and Washington concur, is incompatible with even the appearance of a conflict ,of
interest.

B. EIS Procedure
The heart of SEQRA and all of the little NEPA's is the environmental impact statement process. This is the "action forcing" ele. ~is
~
ment which makes the stewardship role realistic and p r a c t i ~ a lIt
this process which admits of a shared common law among the little
NEPA's. The key stages of the SEQRA procedures can be construed
in light of the analogous rulings of other jurisdictions. In like vein,
New York's growing case law is becoming a part of the body of authority available to assist other jurisdictions.
Six principal steps characterize the EIS process. Initially, there is
the threshold question of whether or not SEQRA applies to a given
a c t i ~ n . "Second
~
is the lead agency de~ignation.~~
Third is the negative declaration or the finding of a Type I action requiring preparation of an environmental impact statement.70 Fourth is the preparation of the draft EIS (DEIS) and review of alternative^.^^ Fifth is the
preparation of the final EIS (FEIS) and full identification of impacts
and their possible mitigation.la Finally, there is judicial review of this
O7 There is ample commentary on the action-forcing element of 8 102(2)(C) of NEPA and the
little NEPA's. See, e.g., F. ANDERSON,
NEPA IN THE COURTS:A LEGALANALYSIS
OP THE NATIONAL. ENVIRONMENTAL
POLICYACT (1973); R. LIROFP,A NATIONAL
POLICYFOR THE ENVIRONMENT (1976).
" Concerning actions, see 6 N.Y.C.R.R. 8 617.2(b) (1979). See also Marsh, supra note 7, a t
1099-100,1106-09.
'O "When an action is to be carried out or approved by two or more agencies, the determination of whether the action may have a significant effect on the environment shall be made by
the lead agency having principal responsibility for carrying out or approving such action and
such agency shall prepare, or cause to be prepared . . . the environmental impact statement."
N.Y. ENVTL.CONSERV.
LAW8 8-0111(6) (McKinney Supp. 1981-1982). Concerning lead agency
designation, see 6 N.Y.C.R.R. 8 617.6 (1979). Aa to one agency and as to more than one agency,
see id. 4 617.2(c) &(d).
70 A negative declaration is a decision not to prepare on EIS because the proposed action will
not have a significant effect on the environment. Id. 8 617.12(a). The significance of an action ie
determined under criteria set forth in id. 8 617.10(c); the negative declaration for nonsignificant
acts appears in id. 8 617.10(b).
The required contents of a DEIS are governed by id. 5 617.14(d). On alternatives, see id. 8
617.14(f).
7 s The FEIS contains the comments on the DEIS and the final analysis. Id. $8 617.8 &
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process along with the final agency decision itself and the resolution
of who has standing to seek review.?)'
Although there is little case law concerning SEQRA's EIS procedure to rely on, references can be usefully drawn from California and
Washington. Because the little NEPA's from these two states were
models from which SEQRA was in part adapted," the judicial glosses
on their state environmental impact assessment process are apt
sources to guide the evolution of SEQRAY6
1. Whether the EIS Process Applies to a Given Action

Much rides on the initial decision that an action requires an EIS.
Failure to undertake the EIS process frustrates SEQRA's stewardship and courts will enjoin actions seeking to circumvent the Act.?@
The validity of subsequent permits may be subject to invalidati~n.~~
Several early New York cases ratified exemptions from the SEQRA
Where facts of the underlying action manifestly constituted
a Type I action under SEQRA, the cases favoring exemptions appear
to be wrongly decided;?@the rule of reason and remedial purposes of
SEQRA militate that actions not be exempted.s0
The logic of California's Friends of Mammoth decisione1 should
617.14(h). Mitigation must be shown a t this time. Id. 5 617.9(~)(2).
78 Final agency action is the approval or disapproval step which occurs 30 days after the
FEIS is filed. Id. 5 617.9(b). Judicial review is available under article 78 of the CPLR. N.Y. CIV.
PRAC.LAW5 7800-7806 (McKinney 1981).
74 This Article is not intended to be an exhaustive treatise of the commentary on each of
these six steps from each of the nineteen states which have little NEPA's akin to SEQRA. See
generally authority cited in notes 16 & 18 supra.
76 See text accompanying note 31 supra.
H.O.M.E.S. v. New York State Urban Dev. Corp., 69 A.D.2d 222,418 N.Y.S.2d 827 (1979).
55 N.Y.2d 41, 432 N.E.2d 592, 447 N.Y.S.2d 699 (1982).
77 See Citizens Task Force on SOH10 v. Board of Harbor Comm'rs, 23 Cal. 3d 812,591 P.2d
1236, 153 Cal. Rptr. 584 (1979). For other agency actions which can be invalidated for lack of
an EIS, see Tri-County Taxpayers h ' n , Inc. v. Town Bd., 55 N.Y.2d 41, 432 N.E.2d 592, 447
N.Y.S.2d 699 (1982) (election appropriating funds for a sewer district annulled for lack of an
EIS). See generally N.Y. GEN.MUN.LAW5 239-m (McKinney 1974). See abo Rye Town/King
Civic Ass'n v. Town of Rye, 82 A.D.2d 474, 442 N.Y.S.2d 67, appeal dismissed, 55 N.Y.2d 747
(1981); Weinstein v. Nicosia, 32 Misc. 2d 246, 223 N.Y.S.2d 187 (Sup. Ct. 1962), aff'd.,18
A.D.2d 881, 236 N.Y.S.2d 1023 (1963).
See, e.g., County of Franklin v. Connelie, 68 A.D.2d 1000, 415 N.Y.S.2d 110 (1979); In re
Hopkins, 99 Misc. 2d 216, 415 N.Y.S.2d 774 (Sup. Ct. 1979).
See, e.g., County of Franklin v. Connelie, 68 A.D.2d 1000, 415 N.Y.S2d 110 (1979).
Town of Henrietta v. Department of Envtl. Conservation, 76 A.D.2d 215,430 N.Y.S.2d 440
(1980).
Friends of Monmouth v. Bd. of Supervisors, 8 Cal. 3d 247, 502 P.2d 1049, 104 Cal. Rptr.
761 (1972).
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serve to guide SEQRA. California courts regularly require application
of the EIS process in many varied circumstances. CEQA applies to
power plant authorizations, to actions with environmental impacts
outside the jurisdiction of the entity preparing the EIS, to annexation of land by a municipality, to permits for subdivisions, and to
other local zoning decision^."^ Comparably broad rulings are found in
the State of W a s h i n g t ~ n . ~ ~
Ministerial actions may be exempt from SEQRA," but they must
be identified as being ministerial beyond cavil. Washington has found
it difficult to draw the line between ministerial and major actions. In
Eastlake Community Council u. Roanoke Associates,B6 Washington's
highest court ruled that where a building permit renewal was
"mandatory" no EIS was needed, but where the renewal was "nonduplicative" and discretionary and there was no prior environmental
review, then an EIS was required. Care must be taken to define the
"ministerial" e x e m p t i ~ n . ~ ~
The California courts have furthered CEQA's remedial purposes by
restricting exemptions through narrow constructions7 and by declining to find implied exemption^.^^ Where discretion is involved in an
agency decision, there is usually an opportunity to mitigate environmental harm. For such action, an EIS is required.
OD See, e.g., Desert Envtl. Conservation Ass'n v. Public Utile. Comm'n, 8 Cal. 3d 739, 505
P.2d 223,106 Cal. Rptr. 31 (1973) (power plants); County of Inyo v. Yorty, 32 Cal. App. 3d 795,
108 Cal. Rptr. 377 (1973) (outside jurisdiction); Bozung v. Local Agency Formation Comm'n, 37
Cal. App. 3d 842, 112 Cal. Rptr. 668 (1974), aff'd, 13 Cal. 2d 483,531 P.2d 783, 119 Cal. Rptr.
215 (1975) (annexation); People v. Country of Kern, 39 Cal. App. 3d 830, 115 Cal. Rptr. 67
(1974) (general land use plan); Rosenthal v. Board of Supervisors, 44 Cal. App. 3d 815,119 Cal.
Rptr. 282 (1975) (local rezoning).
Loveless v. Yantis, 82 Wash. 2d 754, 513 P.2d 1023 (en banc) (subdivision plan approval);
Eastlake Community Council v. Roanoke Assocs., Inc., 82 Wash. 2d 475,513 P.2d 36 (1973) (en
banc) (condominium); Stempel v. Department of Water Resources, 82 Wash. 2d 109, 508 P.2d
166 (1973) (en banc) (withdrawal of water); Juanita Bay Valley Community Ass'n v. City of
Kirkland, 9 Wash. App. 59, 510 P.2d 1140 (1973) (municipal grading permit).
6 N.Y.C.R.R. 1 617.13(d) (1979) (exempting routine and maintenance activity).
82 Wash. 2d 475, 513 P.2d 36 (1973) (en banc). See also Loveless v. Yantie, 82 Wash. 2d
754, 513 P.2d 1023 (1973) (en banc) (on exemption.for ministerial actions).
See Note, Aftermath; Friends of Mammoth and the Amended California Environmental
Quality Act, 3 ECOLOGY
L.Q., 349, 386-87 (1973) (critical discussion of California case law).
Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc. v. Arcata Nat'l Corp., 59 Cal. App. 3d 959, 131
Cal. Rptr. 172 (1976).
Wildlife Alive v. Chickering, 18 Cal. 3d 190, 553 P.2d 537, 132 Cal. Rptr. 377 (1976); International Longshoremen's & Warehousemen's Union v. Board of Supervisors, 116 Cal. App. 3d
265, 171 Cal. Rptr. 875 (1981).
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2. The Designation of a Lead Agency

Where a project must be approved by more than one agency, it is
essential for the effective and efficient operation of the EIS process
that, as early as possible, one be identified as the agency responsible
for conducting the environmental reviewn8@
This is the "lead" agency.
Not only must one agency assume that burden of EIS responsibility,
but other agencies must assist it in doing so. The need for efficient
execution of this stage led to amendments of CEQA aimed at assigning the burden of EIS resp~nsibility.~~
3. The Decision to Require an EIS

Guidance from other states can be of assistance in determining
when and whether an EIS is needed under SEQRA. ' ' ~ e ~ m e n k tion,"@lor the division of what would be a Type I action into small
bits and pieces, each with insignificant impact, is usually not alEven if the action would have a Type I classification, a decision must still be made as to when in time the action exists. A mere
plan to act may not trigger ran EIS.88 If an agency is unsure whether
an act is advanced enough to require an EIS under CEQA, it can
order tests and research."' This goes beyond the administrative environmental assessment form (EAF) now used under SEQRA.
The general criteria for deciding when an impact is significant, so
as to require an EIS, have been reviewed often. In Norway Hill Preservation and Protection Association o. King County C o u n ~ i l , ~ ~
Washington's Supreme Court defined "significantly" as "whenever
more than a moderate effect on the quality of the environment is a
6 N.Y.C.R.R. 8 617 (1979).
Pridgeon, Anderson & Delphey, State Environmental Policy Acts: A Survey of Recent
Developments, 2 HARV.ENVTL.L. REV.419, 427-28 (1977).
Segmentation is the term derived from the practice of dividing highways into small linking
units to avoid reviewing the entire route. See, eg., River v. Richmond Metropolitan Auth., 359
F. Supp. 611, 634 (1973), aff'd, 481 F.2d 1280 (4th Cir. 1973).
See, e.g., Plan for Arcadia, Inc. v. Arcadia City Council, 42 Cal. App. 3d 712, 117 Cal. Rptr.
96, 105 (1974). The very fact of exercising discretion in making this decision may mean that the
EIS must be done. Loveless v. Yantis, 82 Waah. 2d 754, 513 P.2d 1023 (1973).
See, e.g., No Oil, Inc. v. City of Los Angeles, 13 Cal. 3d 68, 529 P.2d 66, 118 Cal. Rptr. 34
(1974); Lake County Energy Council v. County of Lake, 70 Cal. App. 3d 851,139 Cal. Rptr. 176
(1977); County of Inyo v. Yorty, 32 Cal. App. 3d 795, 108 Cal. Rptr. 377 (1973).
*' See, e.g., Society for Cal. Archaeology v. County of Butte, 65 Cal. App. 3d 832, 135 Cal.
Rptr. 679 (1977); People v. County of Kern,62 Cal. App. 3d 761, 133 Cal. Rptr. 389 (1976).
*' 87 Wash. 2d 267, 552 P.2d 674 (1976).
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reasonable pr~bability."~~
Factors considered by the court were the
size of the project, the type of environmental change, and the classification of the project under SEPA.e7If no EIS had been prepared and
the action was significant, then even extensive prior discussion and
the attachment of the protective conditions would be insufEcient according to the court.BBThe court held that SEPA mandates full disclosure and investigation before decisionmaking precisely to ensure
that adequate protective measures could be taken." Ultimately,
whether an EIS is required is a mixed question of law and fact. A
rule of reasonableness should govern review of this determination.lo0
4. The Draft EIS and Consideration of Alternatives

The DEIS is intended to be a comprehensive and fair review of all
the adverse environmental effects of the proposed action. The central
analytic tool for highlighting these impacts is a discussion of alternatives. By requiring a discussion of the effect of no action or a modified action, the decisionmaker identifies a way to avoid adverse impacts and is less reluctant to describe the range of realistically
possible adverse effects in a candid fashion.
The EIS process must consider all aspects of a proposed action.
Under CEQA, close scrutiny is given to such consideration. Thus, in
County of Inyo v. Los Angeles,lol the court found a number of deficiencies in the consideration of alternatives and impacts. The court
found two major deficiencies in the environmental impact report
(EIR).'OP First, the court held that consideration of alternatives must
Id. at 278,552 P.2d a t 680 (quoting City of Davis v. Coleman, 521 F.2d 661,673-74 & n.16
(9th Cir. 1975)).
Id. at 275-76 & n.8, 552 P.2d at 679 & 681 n.8.
Id. The court noted earlier that it chose the "clearly erroneous" administrative standard of
review because SEPA's intent could easily be frustrated by declarations of no significance. Id.
at 276, 552 P.2d at 679.
Id. at 275,552 P.2d at 679. The court recognized that the "most important aspect of SEPA
is the consideration of environmental values . . . [SEPA] 'is an attempt by the people to shape
their future environment by deliberation, not default.' " Id. at 272, 552 P.2d at 677 (quoting
Stempel v. Department of Water Resources, 82 Wash. 2d 109, 118, 508 P.2d 166, 172 (1973)).
loo Wisconsin's Envtl. Decade, Inc. v. Public Sew. Comm'n, 79 Wis. 2d 409, 256 N.W.2d 149
(1977). For a similar ruling under SEQRA, see Town of Henrietta v. Department of Envtl.
Conservation, 76 A.D.2d 215, 430 N.Y.S.2d 440 (1980).
lo' 71 Cal. App. 3d 185,139 Cal. Rptr. 396 (1977). See abo Laurel Hills Homeowners Ass'n v.
City Council, 83 Cal. App. 3d 515, 147 Cal. Rptr. 842 (1978).
lo' An EIR is an environmental impact report and is the equivalent of SEQRA's EIS. Compare CAL.PUB.RES.CODE5 21100 (Deering 1981) with N.Y.ENVTL. CONSERV.
LAW 8-0101 to
-0117 (McKinney Supp. 1981-1982).

Heinonline - - 46 Alb. L. Rev. 1171 1981-1982

1172

Albany Law Review

[Vol. 46

include a "no project" alternative.lo8 Second, the court held that the
EIR was void because it was based on an inaccurate project description.lO' The court noted that the revised EIR described a small scale
groundwater project and that the final EIR dealt with large scale
phases of the City's aqueduct management program.'06 The County
of Inyo court recognized that the interim EIR's may be based on new
insights requiring revision. It refused, however, to validate the project
when its scope was known in advance but was deliberately misstated
to confuse the public.'OB The court reemphasized that the scope of
the project and all reasonable alternatives must be included in the
EIR.'07
An alternative can be feasible and merit review in the EIS even
though the applicant would reject undertaking such a course.10BAn
alternative must, therefore, be examined in the EIS even though the
agency may later make an independent decision as to whether or not
to make the alternative a condition of approval as a form of mitigation to comply with SEQRA's substantive mandate discussed below.
The scope of the EIS must include secondary and cumulative
impacts.lo9
One useful technique, first developed in Massach~setts,"~
is "scoping," a means of focusing on important issues and streamlining the
method of review. When NEPA was enacted, it did not include a
scoping provision but the revised implementing regulations now address the issue."' SEQRA has no specific provision on scoping, but
the concept can be read into the Act."% Scoping is especially useful a t
lo' County of Inyo v. City of Los Angeles, 71 Cal. App. 3d 185, 193, 203, 139 Cal. Rptr. 396,
401, 408.
I M Id. a t 192-93, 199-200, 139 Cal. Rptr. at 401, 406.
I0"d.
at 190-91, 199, 139 Cal. Rptr. at 399-400, 406.
Id. at 199-200, 139 Cal. Rptr. at 406.
lor Id.
lo' Arcata Redwood Co. v. State Bd. of Forestry, 7 ENVTL.
L. REP. (ENVTL.L. INST.)ll 20,755
(Cal. Super. Ct. Sept. 8, 1977).
'Oe Bozung v. Local Agency Formation Comm'n, 13 Cal. 3d 263, 283-84, 529 P.2d 1017, 1030,
118 Cal. Rptr. 249, 262 (1975). Cf. Wisconsin Environmental Policy Act, supra note 22 at 15356 (describing the Wisconsin experience).
no MASSANN.LAWSch. 30, 88 61-62H (MichieLaw Co-op 1973 Supp. 1981).
"I
40 C.F.R. 8 1501.7 (1981). See also notes 131-32 and accompanying text infra.
11'
N.Y. ENVTL.CONSERV.
LAW8 8-0109(2) lists specific considerations to be included in the
EIS and provides that it "should not contain more detail than is appropriate." Id. This section
also provides that "agencies may make their own independent judgment of the scope, contents
and adequacy of an environmental impact statement." Id. 8 8-0109(3). DEC's implementing
regulations provide that impact statements should not be "encyclopedic," 6 N.Y.C.R.R. 8
617.14(b) (1979), and "should not contain more detail than is appropriate considering the nature and magnitude of the proposed action and the significance of its potential impacts." Id. 8
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the beginning of the EIS process where a scoping conference is often
held with the lead agency.l18

5. The Final EIS Proposals for Mitigation
Not only must an FEIS under SEQRA fully review adverse environmental effects and identify alternatives, but viable steps for mitigating those effects must also be discussed. The final agency decision
should make appropriate mitigation a condition for project approval.
The failure to select a feasible alternative which would avert environmental harm gives the agency the option in some jurisdictions to
deny the requested approval.ll' This is ultimate mitigation. There is
authority under CEQA that an agency need only impose feasible mitigation, not the most environmentally superior alternative.ll5 With
SEQRA's social and economic compatibility provisions,116this CEQA
rule may be appropriate in New York.
SEQRA, unlike NEPA, expressly embodies the requirement of substantive mitigation."' As in Washington, this means that a permit
may be denied on the grounds that it would degrade the environment
excessively in contravention of SEQRA's stewardship responsibilities.l18 Among all the little NEPA's, Minnesota's statute probably
imposes the greatest substantive burden."@
Even after an action has gone forward without a valid EIS or absent all feasible mitigation, the SEQRA duty to assure that feasible
mitigation be considered and applied must be discharged. This may
mean retrofitting a project. Both Californialao and New Yorklal
courts have reached this EIS implication in their rulings.
617.14(c).
In fact, DEC's regulations governing procedures for DEC permit approvals strongly recommend th.at the applicant request a scoping conference where an EIS is necessary. Id. 5 621.3
(1977).
l L 4 I n re City of White Bear Lake, 311 Minn. 146, 247 N.W.2d 901 (1976).
11' Laurel Hills Homeowners Ass'n v. City Council, 83 Cal. App. 3d 515, 147 Cal. Rptr. 842
(1978). This ruling is criticized in Note, CEQA's Substantive Mandate Clouded by Appellate
Court, 8 ENVTL.L. REP. (ENVTL.L. INST.) U 10,208 (1978).
lIe N.Y. ENVTL.
CONSERV.
LAW5 8-0109(1) (McKinney Supp. 1981-1982).
l L 7 See Gitlen, The Substantive Impact of SEQRA, 46 ALB. L. REV. 1241 (1982); Ulasewicz,
supra note 5. As to CEQA, see Substantive Enforcement, supra note 22.
See, e.g., Polygon Corp. v. City of Seattle, 90 Wash. 2d 59, 578 P.2d 1309 (1978).
118 State v. Erickson, 285 N.W.2d 84 (Minn. 1979).
lS0 San Diego Trust & Savings Bank v. Friends of Gill, 121 Cal. App. 3d 203, 174 Cal. Rptr.
784 (1981).
la'
Rye TownIKing Civic Ass'n v. Town of .Rye, 82 A.D.2d 474, 442 N.Y.S.2d 67, appeal
dismissed, 55 N.Y.2d 747 (1981).
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6. Standing and Judicial Review

The entire EIS process is enforced through recourse to the courts
by way of judicial review of the agency action. The lead agency must
compile a careful record documenting the EIS process.1aaThis record
is the basis for determining both the procedural correctness and the
substantive reasonableness of the agency's decision.
Judicial review is contemplated as the principal means for enforcing agency adherence to SEQRA's stewardship responsibilitie~.~~~
The criteria for any citizen's standing to so enforce SEQRA is found
in the pre-SEQRA ruling of Douglaston Civic Association v. Galvin.la4While courts have occasionally found that the standing criteria
of Douglaston have not been met,la5the pattern of New York standing cases follows the federal lead in liberally construing environmental noneconomic interests as being of sufficient weight to accord
standing to their champions to enforce SEQRA.lS6In this respect,
most jurisdictions in zoning and land use cases analogous to EIS
cases today accord standing to civic groups.la7
The literature on the scope of judicial review of an EIS process
under little NEPA's has been extensively developed.la8 Since SEQRA
relies on each state agency and local government to remake its own
procedures to assure that its stewardship duties will be met, only the
courts can assure that a uniform statewide process will eventually
emerge.la8This will take time and will ultimately call for the guiding
hand of the court of appeals. Uniformity of EIS application will
la' Norway Hill Preservation & Protection Ass'n v. King County Council, 87 Wash. 2d 267,
275-76,552 P.2d 674,679 (1976); Wisconsin's Envtl. Decade v. Public Serv. Comm'n, 79 Wis. 2d
409, 419, 256 N.W.2d 149, 155 (1977).
la8 See also Wisconsin's Envtl. Decade v. Public Sew. Comm'n, 79 Wisc. 2d 409, 256 N.W.2d
149 (1977); authority discussed in Wisconsin Environmental Policy Act, supra note 22, a t 16166. The pattern was fixed under NEPA with Calvert Cliffs' Coordinating Comm., Inc. v. United
States Atomic Energy Comm'n, 449 F.2d 1109 (D.C. Cir. 1971).
la' 36 N.Y.2d 1, 324 N.E.2d 317,364.N.Y.S.2d 830 (1974). For further discussion of standing
to sue under SEQRA, see Crary, Procedural Issues Under SEQRA, 46 ALB. L. REV.1211, 121123 (1982).
"".W.A.R.E.,
Inc. v. North Hempstead, 81 Misc. 2d 1010, 367 N.Y.S.2d 374 (Sup. Ct.
1975).
la0 United States v. Students Challenging Regulatory Agency Procedures, 412 U.S. 669
(1973); Sierra Club v. Morton, 405 U.S. 727 (1972). See also Simons v. City of Los Angeles, 100
Cal. App. 3d 496, 161 Cal. Rptr. 67 (1979); Residents of Beverly Glen, Inc. v. City of Los Angeles, 34 Cal. App. 3d 117, 109 Cal. Rptr. 724 (1973); SAVE a Valuable Environment v. City of
Bothell, 89 Wash. 2d 862, 576 P.2d 401 (1978).
Ia7 See Annot., 8 A.L.R.4th 1087 (1981).
"'See, e.g., Roe & Lean, supra note 22, at 533-40.
lag Uniformity of application has been criticized under other little NEPA's. See, e.g., Quest
for Uniformity, supra note 22.
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therefore be enhanced by following the precedents of sister states
where applicable.

Recurring patterns of new land uses and development exist
throughout the United States. It is only natural, therefore, that state
legislatures have sought to regulate and control these developments
in similar ways. The environmental impact assessment process a t its
best is a technique not just to protect environmental.quality, but also
to promote the ordered growth of society. The courts do much to advance both wise use of natural resources and social and economic development by reinforcing the legislative judgment that environmental
impact analysis shall be a part of all governmental decisionmaking in
the federal government and in states such as New York, California
and Washington.
Just as the experiences under the ~assachbsettslittle NEPAISO
gave the Council.on Environmental Quality the idea of "scoping" to
narrow an EIS,lS1and the NEPA regulations now include a requirement for scoping,lsa so also the NEPA process can guide the states'
little NEPA's. An evolving and symbiotic relationship exists between
NEPA and the comparable state laws, just as there is one among the
state enactments.
The New York Legislature should' seek to improve. and streamline
SEQRA by considering the strengths in other states' little NEPA's.
For one thing, a New York oversight body, analogous to the President's Council on Environmental Quality,lsSshould be created to facilitate the work of SEQRA. Such a body could exist in either the
Department of Environmental Conservation or the Department of
State. A similar proposal has been made for C,alif~rnia.'~~
In like vein, the New York courts should draw on the wealth of EIS
case law around the nation in shaping.SEQRA. A common body of
law, adapted mutatis mutandis for each state, now exists. The judiciMASS.ANN.LAWSch. 30, 88 61-62H (MichieLaw Co-op 1973 & Supp. 1981).
See 40 C.F.R. 83 1500.4, 1501.1, 1501.4, 1501.7, 1502.9, 1506.8 (1979); [I9781 COUNCIL
ON
ENVIRONMENTAL
QUALITY
ANN. REP., ENVIRONMENTAL
QUALITY
396, 398 (discussing Council on
Environmental Quality revisions to NEPA regulations). For a further discussion of scoping, see
notes 110-13 and accompanying text supra.
"'40 C.F.R. 8 1501.7 (1981).
ma 42 U.S.C. $8 4341-4347. See also Crary, supra note 124, at 1231-32.
I"
Quest for Uniformity, supra note 22, at 873-76.
IB0
la'
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ary can and should do much to mold this corpus of ordered common
law which environmental impact laws make possible.
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